India & world in Modi 3.0 | Explained News

India & world in Modi 3.0 | Explained News
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What could the foreign policy of the Narendra Modi government in its third term look like? With no change at the top at the Ministry of External Affairs, a broad continuity is indicated. However, there will be some calibration and re-setting of the agenda for specific regions, depending on the changing global situation and Indian strategic imperatives.
Leaders of seven countries in India’s neighbourhood — Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles — attending the swearing-in of the new government. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Myanmar were not invited.

There was no substantive bilateral meeting with any neighbourhood leader.
India will have to be nimble in its diplomacy in the neighbourhood, and be unilaterally generous without insisting on reciprocity. Several neighbours look forward to a restrained and sensitive Modi 3.0 rather than an overbearing New Delhi that frequently flexes its muscle.
PAKISTAN: For his 2014 swearing-in, Modi had invited the leaders of SAARC countries, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. India’s engagement with Pakistan went through ups and downs in 2014 and 2015, before being wrecked by the terrorist attacks in Pathankot and Uri in 2016.
In 2019, the Pulwama attack and Balakot strikes fuelled nationalist sentiment in India and contributed to the BJP’s victory. But ties with Pakistan suffered a grievous setback. The constitutional changes in J&K in August 2019 was the final blow that led to the downgrading of the diplomatic relationship.
The situation in Pakistan has changed since then. Imran Khan, who was Prime Minister in 2019, is in prison, the economy is in deep crisis, and the Sharifs, who are now backed by the Army, are back in power. Nawaz and his brother, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, have reached out with messages of hope and peace.
Modi has responded that “security” — that is, countering Pak-backed terrorism — is India’s priority. New Delhi’s policy line for the last nine years has been that “terror and talks can’t go together”. The series of terror attacks in J&K over the last few days have put paid to any potential build-up of public opinion in favour of a possible engagement.
AFGHANISTAN: There is no diplomatic relationship with Kabul since the Taliban captured power in August 2021. There is low-level engagement through a technical team assigned to help in humanitarian aid, but high-level engagement has been ruled out for now. A working relationship is likely to continue.
MYANMAR: The challenge has been to engage with the junta government that has been preoccupied with armed resistance internally. Myanmarese government forces have been on the defensive since the fighting began in October 2023. It has been suggested in Indian strategic circles that given the possibility of the government’s collapse, New Delhi should start engaging with the opposition groups.
MALDIVES: The visit of President Mohamed Muizzu, who rode to power on an “India Out” plank, was especially significant. After India replaced military personnel manning Indian air assets in Maldives with trained technical personnel as requested by the Muizzu government, New Delhi and Malé have appeared ready to engage.
BANGLADESH: Campaign rhetoric about “infiltrators” has often soured ties with Dhaka. Greater restraint from members of the government and the ruling party during Modi 3.0 is likely to be beneficial, since both sides have a common purpose in countering extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism.
BHUTAN: India has been ready to support Thimphu with assistance in its five-year plan, a financial stimulus package, and the Gelephu mindfulness city project. This is expected to continue, especially since China is trying to negotiate the border with Bhutan on its own terms. India wants Bhutan, which is caught between the two Asian giants, on its side.
NEPAL: Ties with Nepal present a delicate challenge. China has a strong political footprint in Nepal, and the government in Kathmandu in which former Prime Minister K P Sharma Oli is an important player, is perceived to be trying to use the Beijing card against New Delhi. The decision to put the unilaterally redrawn borders of Nepal on the national currency suggests this will continue. New Delhi will have to work hard to regain the trust of the Nepali people that took a blow after the economic blockade of 2015.
SRI LANKA: The goodwill gained by India on the Sri Lankan street after helping out with the island nation’s financial crisis was jeopardised by the needless raking up of Katchatheevu ahead of elections in Tamil Nadu. Strengthening the Sri Lankan economy with financial assistance as well as investments will be a key task ahead of elections in that country later this year.
SEYCHELLES & MAURITIUS: India’s plans to help upgrade ports infrastructure in these countries is part of its maritime diplomacy and security effort. Some success has been achieved at Agalega Islands in Mauritius, but developing Assumption Island in Seychelles has presented a challenge.
The Western countries
The Modi government’s engagement with the West has been more transactional than several previous governments. It has also developed strong strategic ties with the US, Europe, Japan, and Australia.
There was a lot of noise during the campaign about Western “interference”, provoked by criticism of the government in Western media. The aggressive Indian response showed that the government, even after a decade in office, remains extremely sensitive to commentary in the West, and sometimes to even anodyne comments by Western governments. Démarches were issued against friendly Western governments like the US and Germany in election season.
The Indian relationship with the US has bipartisan support and is not expected to be impacted by the outcome of the November presidential elections. Defence and cutting edge tech will drive ties going forward.
Economic and political ties with European countries such as France and Germany have improved, and the UK has been keen to conclude a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with India. India and the EU too are keen to conclude an FTA to the mutual benefit of their economies.
The alleged plot to assassinate Khalistani separatist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun has been a major sore point with the West, which views India as a democratic, rule-of-law-abiding partner. The visit of US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan next week will test the strength of Indo-US diplomatic ties, and perhaps indicate a path to unlocking this issue.
Political ties with Canada — in free fall ever since Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused India of having a hand in the murder of another Khalistani separatist — are likely to remain strained at least until the Canadian elections of 2025. However, economic ties and student flows to Canada have not been impacted.
The West would like Modi 3.0 to be less thin-skinned about criticism and comments, and be ready to engage and do business with them. From New Delhi’s perspective, the ideal scenario would be to secure Indian interests and benefit from Western capital and technology while not being lectured on its domestic matters. The PM’s engagements at the G7 in Italy might signal steps in this direction.
The China challenge
The border standoff is about to enter its fifth year, and the task before Modi 3.0 is difficult and knotty.
India has maintained that all cannot be well until the border situation becomes normal. New Delhi wants complete disengagement and then de-escalation, and it will take a lot of time to move 50,000-60,000 troops and weapons away from both sides of the border.
High-level engagements, especially Modi’s meeting with President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in the first week of July on the sidelines of the SCO summit, may hold potential for an unlock.
Tightrope on Russia
India’s ties with Russia are being tested by the war in Ukraine. Defence requirements are at the heart of India’s Russian dependency, and the availability of cheaper oil has now added energy to the basket.
Russia has not collapsed under Western sanctions, and it is now widely seen as having the upper hand in the war.
India is likely to skip the June 15-16 peace conference in Switzerland at the highest level, given that Russia will not be in the room. But India is expected to be represented at an official level, and to emphasise on dialogue and diplomacy. For peace, both Russia and Ukraine must come to the table, and while Modi 3.0 would want to contribute to the process, it would not like to cause hurt to itself.
High stakes in West Asia
Modi 1.0 and 2.0 built ties with countries and leaders in the region, from Saudi Arabia to Israel, UAE to Iran, Qatar to Egypt. Energy security, investments, and the 9-million-strong Indian diaspora in the region have been the major stakes for India.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), I2U2, International North South Transit Corridor (INSTC) are all thought to be game changers, but the Israel-Hamas conflict has introduced uncertainty.
India would be keen to see the end of the war in Gaza.
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